I. INTRODUCTION
Is the export of U.S.-style alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") simply the propagation of technocratic, apolitical methods of resolving conflict and good governance? Or is it imperialist "soft technology" perpetuating neocolonial hegemony? On the one hand, proponents argue that U.S.-style ADR is cross-culturally adaptable, and provides greater access to justice and self-determination to parties otherwise without legal recourse.' On the other, critics counter that the effort promotes a neoliberal agenda of capitalist globalization and, with it, a pacifist ideology of social control. 2 On the ground, scholars have observed that the spread of U.S.-style ADR produces sites for local resistance and popular justice. 3 Implementing U.S.-style ADR in former Western Colonies, it turns out, reproduces a neocolonial dynamic of domination and resistance between former colonial master and subject.
In this article, I examine how this process is unfolding in the Philippines, a former U.S. colony. International rule-of-law programs-the vehicles for the export of U.S.-style mediation-have led to wide-ranging reforms in that country, among them the strengthening of the neighborhood justice system, expansion of court-annexed mediation, and enactment of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. Analyzing how such efforts are affecting three grassroots-level dispute-processing systems-indigenous dispute resolution, the neighborhood justice system, and court-annexed mediation-I focus on how community mediation can promote genuine access to justice and self-determination. 4 This article proceeds in four parts. Drawing from representative case studies, I highlight in Part I emerging practices in the global South counterhegemonic to the fundamentals of U.S.-style mediation. In Part II, I describe the Philippine community mediation experience, in particular the ideologies, structures, and practices of indigenous dispute resolution, the neighborhood justice system, and court-annexed mediation. In Part III, I discuss access to justice and self-determination as they relate specifically to community mediation in a postcolonial context. Finally, in Part IV, using qualitative research I conducted in the country in the summer of 2010, I critique the implementation of U.S.-style mediation in the Philippines as antithetical to access to justice and self-determination, propose structural and other Promoting the rule of law also has come to include what Nader calls the "globalization of informal law"-or ADR. 12 International rule-of-law initiatives began including ADR, and mediation specifically, as a programmatic component in the mid-1990s. 13 Led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the American Bar Association (ABA), U.S.-style, primarily facilitative, mediation 1 4 has since become prevalent the world over-from Central and South America 1 5 and marshaling state resources in pursuit of that goal, the purpose of that law seems to be the transfer of the costs of private dispute resolution to the state.
21 See, e.g., Austermiller, supra note 17, at 140-43 (2006); Leon, supra note 15; Reuben, supra note 16, at 4-5 (discussing "thin" and "thick" descriptions of "rule of law."). Note, however, that the argument does not necessarily respond to the compatibility of mediation with the rule of law as such. See Alkon, supra note 17 (arguing for inclusion of ADR in rule of law efforts and against a generalized approach to international development assistance). 22 See, e.g., Leon, supra note 15 (arguing, inter alia, that ADR can support and complement court reform, increase access to justice and facilitate other social change);
Critics, however, denounce the propagation of U.S.-style mediation as promoting neocolonial hegemony-the antithesis of justice and selfdetermination. Nader has been the staunchest and most consistent of these critics, developing in her body of work that "in colonial, national and international settings, harmony law models (consensus-producing models) have been powerful tools of pacification and control." 23 "Harmony law models are often coercive mechanisms of control," she argues, "providing a style of dispute resolution that may move down the slippery slope of lawlessness." 24 Indeed, the observable successes of mediation-how it involves parties in an "ongoing process," consensus-building, and relationship-building 25 -are fully in line with her (and other critics') contention that mediation expands the ambit of state power, defeats democratic decisionmaking, and preserves rather than transforms unequal relationships. 26 As Nader puts it, "Western Christianity spread the harmony legal model in a manner that resembles the modem ADR movement. Both emphasized compromise and consensus as a preferred way of decisionmaking-peace over justice being a mandatory result." 2 7 On the ground, the reality is more complex. The import of U.S. 23 Nader, supra note 2, at 305.
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struggle between the effort to expand state control by non-state means-as Richard Abel has argued 29 -and the:
effort[] by nonstate groups to capture this space for themselves, to counter the expansion of state law with forms of justice based on sources of authority outside the state. The contest waxes and wanes through processes of reform, counterreform, bureaucratization, decentralization, informalism, refusal to keep records, refusal to participate, and user preference for state law.
30
The contest is, in other words, between indigenization and counterhegemonic practice. From above, the neocolonially supported state attempts to expand control through rule-of-law programs, whose relative success comes "from the [ir] ability to link to local strategies that suit locally embedded actors" 3 1 -i.e., indigenization. The process is no different from the imperial policy of indigenizing foreign military occupation, for example the "Iraqification" and "Vietnamization" policies in those two wars. 32 U.S.-style ADR must be similarly indigenized, proponents argue, a process of adaptation particularly well-suited in countries with rich traditions of indigenous dispute resolution. Comparing the Rwandan Gacaca grassroots courts, which were created to deal with the 1994 genocide in that country, and the Arbitration Center of the World Intellectual Property Organization, which provides mediation and other services to resolve international commercial disputes involving intellectual property, for example, Carlos Osi calls for an indigenized Western ADR approach to intellectual property rights issues. 3 3 The challenge, Osi argues, is to fuse the indigenous with the happening as the result of the choice of one mind that freely or coactively receives the produced model. Both in the phase of production and in the phase of reception, legal transplants are a lively dialectic between consent and dissent, between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces, between mainstream and critical approaches."). Western. 34 Anthony Greco makes a similar claim vis-d-vis Ugandan Local Council Courts. 35 Tracing their origin to the Resistance Council Courts that emerged after the dictatorships of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, Greco argues that a small claims procedure in these courts would "provide a reliable and efficient rule of law without the neocolonial imposition of a foreign concept or transplant." 36 In this context, "[m]ediation, properly used as a synthesizing tool, has the potential to bridge the gap between the kind of law needed to operate in a global marketplace and the type of grass roots justice that works on the ground." 37 From below, the resistance to the expansion of state control occurs through an emerging set of counter-hegemonic practices. Rejecting state cooptation of indigenous practices, for example, Penal Reform International, an organization that has studied informal and traditional justice systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, India, and Bangladesh, argues that, to ensure access to justice, indigenous systems should, among other things, not be incorporated in the formal state judicial system, remain entirely voluntary, and issue decisions that are nonbinding. 38 Penal Reform International also argues that the state should not interfere with the appointment of informal arbitrators within a community, and that such arbitrators' jurisdiction not be heavily restricted (but that physically coercive measures be prohibited). Extending Sally Engle Merry's and Christine Harrington's work beyond the ideological dimensions of community mediation in the United States, and refocusing the debate from methods and forms to practices and effects, Amy Cohen has found that Nepalese mediators actively use mediation as a site for grassroots political struggle. 40 In Nepal, Cohen found community mediation practices that were public, rights-based, coercive, and activist in orientation. 4 1 Nepalese mediation practice specifically targeted sexism, This, of course, is an ironic prescription given that U.S. community mediation was modeled after the post-colonial African community moot. See Cain, supra note 3, at 337. Thus, scholars who have studied the transplant of U.S.-style mediation in various postcolonial settings have argued for both top-down prescriptions and bottom-up resistance to U.S.-style mediation along three axes: program ideology and design, mediator role and practice, and external political and organizational support for disputing parties. Each of these three axes is a site for political struggle. Top-down, the neocolonial agenda is manifested in a purportedly apolitical, neutral approach that seeks to "indigenize" U.S.-style mediation, and centralize law and legal processes. Bottom-up, counterhegemonic practices socially contextualize and politicize conflict, and articulate substantive normative agendas: instead of promoting the centralization of law and legal processes, they promote a plural juridical field, allowing for extra-legal outcomes. Instead of discounting legal rights, such practices infuse various processes with them. And instead of focusing only on individual rights and remedies, they collectivize conflict by linking individual claims with broader social issues and recognizing the stake and role of third-party advocacy organizations in the process.
With these practices in mind, I turn to the Philippine community mediation experience. 42 Id. 43 Id. at 337. 44 
III. COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
The propagation of U.S.-style ADR in the Philippines may be seen as part of what Dezalay and Garth have called a "legal revival" in Asia, a program reasserting the "colonial imprint of law." 47 One can see the phenomenon as mirroring, in fact, the U.S. experience in the mid-1970s of extending legal empowerment strategies through the "rights revolution" and public interest law, and, later, non-adjudicative processes. 4 8 In the Philippines, the field of mediation may be categorized into five areas: indigenous dispute resolution, the neighborhood justice system, courtannexed mediation, administrative mediation, 49 and private mediation. My focus here is on the first three systems, their relationships to each other, and the recent, Western-sponsored, reforms that have affected them. For most Filipinos needing third-party or state intervention in their disputes, these three systems govern. The variety and informality of these practices make generalization of IDR methodology difficult. But there are similarities among them. For example, as compared to the U.S. facilitative approach in which a third-party stranger plays the role of facilitator, in IDR authoritative elders are usually the overseer. 52 IDR is less dispute-resolution and more consultation process, the elders less facilitator than arbiter. 53 Mediations are often book-ended by ritual, which may be spiritual, superstitious, or festive. 54 There is no fixed venue, though they are often held in the elder's house. 55 Frequently public or open to the community, no distinction is made between civil and criminal continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 
A. Indigenous Dispute Resolution
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Thus, notwithstanding constitutional language to the contrary, 63 Filipino indigenous dispute resolution is tolerated only insofar as it does not collide with state interests. 64 The concept of "interface," writes Cisnero, "comes from the framework that mainly 'focuses on the official legal and judicial system, conceived as a unified system, and left out of this consideration is the multiplicity of unofficial legal orderings and indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms and justice systems that had long co-existed with the official systems many dating back to the pre-conquest period."' 65
B. The Neighborhood Justice System
In the Philippines, the integration and assimilation of indigenous dispute resolution into the formal legal structure crystallized in the creation of the "Katarungang Pambarangay" (KP)--or neighborhood or village,justicesystem. This integration and assimilation has been so successful, in fact, that it can be difficult to tell whether a dispute is being governed exclusively by an indigenous process, exclusively by the KP process, or both simultaneously. 66 Perversely, a dictator created these popular tribunals: long-time U.S. client Ferdinand Marcos, who decreed, literally, the establishment of the neighborhood justice system by executive order. 67 In 1972, Marcos declared martial law to impose "law and order" on the powerful social movements 457, 459 (1983)) (stating that these laws and traditions "were suppressed if they interfered with the aspirations of soldiers, priests, entrepreneurs and government officials"). 65 Id. at 97 n. 13 (internal citation omitted). that challenged his rule. 68 The KP system was an integral part of his program of centralizing the state, consolidating dictatorial rule, and silencing opposition in the years to follow.
The stated purposes of the KP system were to decongest courts and amicably settle disputes. 69 Then Philippine Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro's rhetoric paralleled those of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger's in the same period: the "overuse, misuse, and abuse of the courts." 70 For parties in dispute, both argued, courts should be the last, not first, resort. 71 But the real agenda was social control. As KP architects Cecilio Pe and Alfredo Tadiar put it, the system was created "in the total context of creating order in society." 72 "[J]ustice delayed is most certainly justice denied. And when the people's thirst for justice is not quenched, each man [sic] will seek to become a law unto himself and the country will once more revert to the anarchic situation which provided the justification for the imposition of martial rule." 73 As we now know, Marcos himself instigated that "anarchic situation." He was behind the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing that killed nine and injured ninety-five of his political opponents, for example, as well as numerous other atrocities that preceded (and became commonplace during) his dictatorship. 74 Hence, like his counterpart and friend Richard Nixon's "law and order" 71 See PE & TADIAR, supra note 69, at 152. 72 Id. at 143. 
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program in the United States, 75 Marcos' creation of the KP system was animated not by access to justice or self-determination, but by their polar opposites, repression and dictatorial control. Indeed, among those trained in the new law were the provincial and city commanders of the Ministry of National Defense, who led the program of impunity. 76 The KP system was an ingenious method of centralized social control. Abolishing organs of democratic governance and resurrecting the "barangay," or neighborhood, as the basic political unit of the country during the period of dictatorial consolidation, Marcos used these newly created political units as a basis of power. As G. Sidney Silliman observed, the creation of the KP system: is a step toward the rationalization, under state coordination, of the existing local institutions for dispute settlement. This is politically significant because it reduces the importance of local elites and forestalls the tendency of the rural population to turn for justice to revolutionary alternatives.
Village conciliation tends to diffuse potential threats to the existing social ,system because it focuses on individual differences rather than on systemic problems, and the rhetoric surrounding the promulgation of the decree is an amplification of the ideology that the Marcos government has utilized to increase its legitimacy. 77 The rhetoric of KP proponents invoked the image of indigenous self-rule "at the root of Filipino culture." 78 Pe and Tadiar claimed that the amicable settlement of disputes on a family and neighborhood level is part of the Filipino identity. 79 Castro envisioned the creation of "neighborhood paralegal committees" as a "salutary throwback to the pre-Spanish times ... when in all kinds of suits, the case was heard before the old men of the district in 
279, 281 (1985).
78 PE & TADIAR, supra note 69, at 5. 79 Id. at 5. The image of the pacific native is, of course, itself a self-serving colonial creation.
which the litigants lived." 8 0 Rhetorically, then, indigenous self-determination and access to justice were among the aspirations that animated the birth of modem ADR in the Philippines.
'it The KP system survived the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1986,81 and its basic structure has remained unchanged. The barangay remains the country's basic political unit. 82 Numbering about 40,000, each is headed by a "punong barangay," or barangay captain. 83 The barangay captain chairs the KP and, under the KP system, is the person to whom parties must first bring their dispute. 84 The barangay captain then has fifteen days to settle the matter. 85 If the dispute does not settle, the barangay captain constitutes a "pangkat," a three-person mediation panel drawn, in turn, from a "lupong tagapamayapa" ("lupon" or peace congregation), also appointed by the barangay captain. This lupon is composed of ten to twenty barangay residents having "integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and reputation for probity." 86 Under Philippine law, pangkat members are quasi-official "persons of authority." 8 7 They are not remunerated. 8 8 Once the barangay captain convenes the pangkat, the pangkat must meet within three days. 89 The pangkat then has up to thirty days to settle the matter. All told, the KP system has forty-eight days in which to 89 Id. at 509.
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settle a claim before it can be allowed to proceed to court. 90 The KP system has jurisdiction over so-called minor disputes and offenses, both civil and criminal, involving residents of the barangay. These include crimes punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos. 9 1 They also include "divorce, spousal abuse, child abuse, theft, assault, land disputes, contract disputes, child abandonment, public drunkenness, slander, and sexual misconduct." 92 Disputants must first use the KP system before going to court. The Philippine Supreme Court has held that a case filed without this prior compliance may be dismissed upon motion of any party.
93
In the effort to dismantle authoritarian rule following the overthrow of the dictatorship, the Philippine Legislature, in 1991, transferred political oversight of the system from the executive to local and provincial governments, in particular the municipal mayor's office. 94 Since then, the KP system has been the subject of various reforms, including a USAID-funded initiative to expand and strengthen its reach to the Muslim south, 95 the further "indigenization" of procedural methods, 96 and the depoliticization and cultural and gender balancing of mediator panels. 97 The KP system continues to be politicized, however, this time from local and provincial elites, rather than the national government. In a study of five municipalities, for example, Rachel Aquino found that barangay captains, who were often 9 0 d. There is a need to review the role of the punong barangay/barangay captain in view of the fact that he is an elective/political official, because much of the literature, survey, and interviews reveal that many residents do not use the system because of the lack of credibility on the punong barangay to render judgment or facilitate dispute resolution in an impartial manner. 99 Aquino argued for the "need to depoliticize the whole system and divert cases away from political figures into more credible members of the community." 0 0 Aquino also found that conciliation panels were only constituted in urban areas, and "often, the disputants do not have a say on its composition." 0 ' Finally, Aquino found that disputants "hardly have a say on how their cases are to be disposed of."' 02 For Filipinos disputing outside, or who do not avail themselves, of indigenous systems, the dictatorship-era KP system is structurally designed to be their first encounter with formal third-party and, here, state intervention.
C. Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution
Disputants who hurdle the jurisdictional prerequisite of the neighborhood justice system encounter a second series of mediations in court. The Philippine judiciary is a four-tier system.1 03 In the first tier are the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, including Muslim Shari'a circuit courts; in the second are regional trial courts, including Shari'a district 98 
MEDIATION AND THE NEOCOLONIAL LEGAL ORDER
courts; in the third are various appellate courts, including a special court for governmental officials accused of graft and corruption; and in the fourth is the Supreme Court, the tribunal of last resort. 104 Litigants are referred to mediation in each of these tiers. The trial courts do it as a matter of policy, and the appellate courts do it on an ad hoc basis.
105
The designers of the neighborhood justice system also designed courtannexed mediation. In 1991, Tadiar, again with backing from USAID,1 06 piloted projects in two jurisdictions, Quezon City and San Fernando, La Union. From these meager beginnings has come a court-annexed mediation (CAM) program now serving more than two-thirds of courts nationwide. In the Philippine judicial system, all civil cases, including "civil aspects" of certain criminal charges, may be referred to mediation. 1 1 3 In trial court, mediation is officially part of the pretrial phase and occurs in two stages. First, the court may order parties to report to a PMC office.1 14 There, PMC mediators "automatically become[] Officer[s] of the Court," 1 15 and parties can admit facts or submit documents to them.11 6 PMC mediators may convene the parties repeatedly; the form they use allows for ten sessions, for example (though I was told by PMC personnel that they can convene parties even more times than that). They are volunteers compensated on a per-case basis and settlement is compensated nearly three times more than impasse. 117 A plaintiffs failure to appear "shall" result in the dismissal of the action "with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court.""l 8 A defendant's nonappearance allows the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte "and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof." 119 (1997, amended 1998) ), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/1997rulesofcivilprocedure.htm. See also id. at 20 (stating that mediator "must report" subsequent nonappearance of parties ordered to mediation). But see id at 29 (stating that only initial appearance is compulsory as "parties cannot be forced to mediate"). 
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If parties do not reach settlement through this process, they go through "judicial dispute resolution" (JDR). JDR is a "series of activities undertaken for failed mediation cases" 1 20 in which a non-presiding judge "becomes a conciliator, early neutral evaluator and/or mediator."'21 Regional trial court Judge Divina Luz Aquino-Simbulan describes that "[a]s a conciliator, the JDR judge persuades parties to reconsider their reluctance to compromise." She further notes that "[a]s an early neutral evaluator, the JDR judge gives a confidential, reasoned oral evaluation but non-binding opinion on the strengths and weaknesses of each party's case and their chances of success." JDR was institutionalized through the Justice Reform Initiative Support (JURIS) project, a Canadian-funded initiative. 123 As the JURIS Design and Management Committee stated, their project "carries court-annexed mediation one step further by having the pre-trial judge undertake a second attempt to settle the dispute when the first mediation fails."' 24 During the JDR process, judges have between thirty and sixty days to settle the case. 125 As of 2010, there were 226 judges trained in JDR.1 2 6
On the appellate level, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court also refer cases to mediation. 127 Appellate Court Mediation (ACM) now exists in the Manila and Cagayan De Oro regions, and between 2007 and 2009, the number of cases referred to ACM went from twenty-seven to 296-a 1,000% jump. 128 120 Operations Manual, supra note 106, at 24. Judicial dispute resolution originated from Canada, which sponsored JURIS project. See Cappelletti, supra note 12, at 291 (noting that judicial mediation within a pretrial conference is "now becoming the norm in many, if not all, the Common Law Provinces.").
121 Aquino-Simbulan, supra note 113, at 29. 122 Id. at 6.
123
The JURIS Project was a five-year project undertaken by the Canadian International Development Agency and the Philippine Government, which commenced in 2003. It had four components: (1) judicial education and mediation/ADR strengthening; (2) reform advocacy; (3) technical studies; and (4) Mediation thus permeates the Philippine legal landscape. Disputants seeking third-party or state intervention, particularly in rural areas, first may undergo some form of mediation through an indigenous process. Thereafter, disputants must mediate through the neighborhood justice system prior to going to court. In court, they then encounter mediation at both the trial and appellate levels. With broad support from the local ADR community and continuing Western assistance and funding for ADR reform in the country, it 
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is fair to say that the influence of U.S.-style mediation will only continue to grow.
134
IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN POSTCOLONIAL COMMUNITY MEDIATION
Despite the insidious ways it has been used, community mediation remains a compelling method of dispute resolution because it has great potential to promote access to justice and self-determination. Less costly and less formal than litigation, it is a much more accessible process, particularly for parties who cannot afford an attorney. Less rigid than litigation or arbitration, it allows participants to determine their own outcomes. 135 In this section, I discuss access to justice and self-determination in postcolonial community mediation specifically. As I have mentioned, proponents who find hope in mediation in the postcolonial setting offer prescriptions from both the top-down and the bottom-up, from structural reform to counterhegemonic practice. www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3827 ("A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, un-coerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome. Parties may exercise self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and outcomes ... A mediator shall not undermine party selfdetermination by any party for reasons such as higher settlement rates, egos, increased fees, or outside pressures from court personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the media or others.").
A. Access to Justice and Self-Determination: Co-extensiveness and Conflict
Access to justice and self-determination are concepts with co-extensive and conflicting dimensions. Traditionally understood, access to justice means access to the rule of law, which, in turn, means access to courts and lawyers. The principle is, of course, the result of the great democratic revolutions that overthrew absolutism.1 36 Deborah Rhode repeatedly has taken the profession to task for failing to live up to this aspiration.1 37 In addition to court reform, pro bono service, and self-help, she advocates for well-designed ADR methods as one avenue by which to access justice.1 38 In contrast to the traditional view of justice as the vindication of rights through courts and the rule of law, justice in mediation "entails empowerment of individuals to shape decisions about their own lives and conflicts on terms that are meaningful to them." 1 39 Joseph Stulberg sees this concept of individual selfdetermination and popular justice as Rawlsian "pure procedural justice." 1 4 0 In mediation, access to justice and self-determination are co-extensive to the extent that mediation allows for the use of both legal and nonlegal norms in the resolution of disputes, a process conducive to a more inclusive quality of justice.141 
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The conflict inheres in how self-determination exceeds the demand for "access." As I have discussed elsewhere, this demand, indeed the ADR movement itself, coincided with the so-called "right turn" in American politics in the mid-1970s. 142 Signaling the ascendancy of public interest lawyering and liberal legalism over its more militant predecessors (i.e., "people's," "movement," and ''poverty" lawyering, and the radicalism of the New Left), "access to justice" in this historically specific sense was a political retreat from the critique that the legal system was, by design, incapable of providing justice. According to this critique, the legal system functioned against the very people-those disenfranchised and marginalized from the formal justice system-that mediation, in particular community mediation, specifically sought to empower. 143 Indeed, this realization is what led feminists and the community justice movement to support ADR in the first place. In this sense, the demand for access to a self-determined process is an oxymoron: why would empowered individuals "seek access" to a process they themselves organically create, manage, and sustain?144 This first contradiction is especially problematic in the postcolonial context, where, as here, a primary sponsor of ADR reform happens to be the former colonizer. 143 See Capulong, supra note 142, at 132-53 (discussing ideological shift from "people's" and "poverty" lawyering challenging the legal system, to "public interest" lawyering seeking "access" to it).
144 Cf Cain, supra note 3, at 340:
The use of legal means to reinforce community or neighbourhood ties thus involves a contradiction. Informal law is a contradiction in terms so far as the working class is concerned. In so far as informal law is law it is destructive of collectivity, the only source of countervailing power to capital. In so far as informalism does not destroy collectivity, that is in so far as it constitutes its subjects in non-individual ways, then this informal procedure is not law. It must be some other form of justice or of social control..
In this setting, accessing the justice offered by these reforms very well may be antithetical to self-determination. Second, in its most idealized form, mediation as a normatively expansive, self-determined, process may yield forms of justice over and above, and, theoretically, even contrary to that which the state and formal legal system can provide or, indeed, will allow. Informal or popular justice, in other words, can be subversive. Thus, at its outer reaches, selfdetermination can undermine the legitimacy and power of the very state and legal system attempting to provide "access to justice" in the first place.
Finally, self-determination has specific features in the postcolonial context. In international law, it is a fundamental, collective right. 145 People in the former colonies have the right to sovereignty, that is, to rule independently and to make law. 146 Thus, where, as here, the former colonizer remains intimately involved with the legal apparatus,1 4 7 we need to examine the collective, national dimensions of individual claims raised in community mediation and ask how they might be furthered or undermined in discrete cases.
With this context in mind, I discuss in this section how we might think of access to justice and self-determination in community mediations in the Philippines and other postcolonial settings.
B. Access to What?
If community mediation provides access to justice, what sort of justice can it provide? Procedural justice does not always result in normative justice, of course. 148 And normative justice cannot possibly be "neutral." Hence, access to justice "must be defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable." 49 Indeed, mediation's promise is precisely Hence, the types of justice parties can access in and through community mediation can span the gamut. The classic binary involves outcomes based on legal and non-legal norms, between formal and informal justice. This binary, however, belies the complexities of mediation justice. Informal justice can be either regressive or progressive. Bookending the twentieth century, for example, is mob justice leading to the lynchings of AfricanAmericans in the early part and the public executions of former Eastern European despots in the latter. Within more peaceful bounds, informal justice can be "second class" or liberatory.1 52 Mediation can surreptitiously reproduce gender and racial biases, for example, 1 5 3 or free parties from legal obligation. 154 Hence, one can think of justice in mediation on a continuum, on one end characterized by individualized outcomes disfranchised by the guarantees of, or in any event within, the prevailing legal and social order, and on the other by collective outcomes gesturing towards a new social order. available at http://www.snap-undp.org/lepknowledgebank/Default.aspx. ("This is an essay that expresses an optimism of will in the face of pessimism of analysis about prospects for advancement of an appropriate form of the rule of law and access to justice to people who now bear the burdens of burgeoning inequality, discrimination, and multiple injustices."). 
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Community mediation justice-and for that matter any notion of justice-is, as Maureen Cain put it, "standpoint specific."' 5 5 Applying "a materialist theory of justice, from a working class standpoint," Cain identifies four types: professionalized justice, "incorporated" or "colonised" justice, populist justice, and collective justice.1 56 Professionalized, incorporated/colonized, and populist justice all obscure the standpoint from which justice is normatively evaluated, Cain argues.1 57 As the form of justice most associated with liberal legalism,1 58 Cain observes that professionalized justice "has become synonymous with the concept of justice itself," that is, individualized, occupational, and having "no object other than itself." 5 9 Incorporated or colonized justice, on the other hand, is "a form of adjudication . .. taken over by or embodied within either an agency of capital itself or an agency of the state." 160 An example is the Better Business Bureau.161 Populist justice views society as an organic whole, composed of separate, classless, and, again, independently constituted individuals.1 62 Populist justice, Cain argues, does not claim to be a neutral adjudicator, but a "true" adjudicator;1 63 it is the form of justice most inimical to working-class interests. Here, truth is not standpoint-specific but "unproblematic and total."' 64 By contrast, collective justice is characterized by, among other features, open and explicit working-class identification and a collective client/subject to which it is accountable.1 65 For the working class, Cain argues, collective justice is the ideal. 166
155 Cain, supra note 3, at 335, 341. ("rule of professional law"). 1 66 Id Sally Engle Merry further typologizes "popular justice"-which I take to include Cain's definition of collective and populist justice-into four cultural traditions: reformist, socialist, communitarian, and anarchic. Merry, supra note 30, at 32. Merry observes, is "a judicial institution located on the boundary between local ordering and state law with ambiguous and shifting relations to each." Id. 
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Extending Cain's perspective and typology to postcolonial settings yields two corollary principles.1 67 First, because ruling national elites benefit independently from ADR reform,. the concept of "justice" cannot be delimited to the nationalistic. The postcolonial period often results in the continued economic and political alliance between former colonizer and national elite, but the national elite has interests of its own, independent of its benefactor. Hence, justice in postcolonial settings must be defined.from the perspective of the nationally disenfranchised and marginalized, here the Philippine poor and working class. Second, community mediation justice is not delimited to certain, principally professionalized and incorporated, forms. It allows for, and, in postcolonial settings, ought to promote, collective justice-that is, standpoint-specific outcomes consistent with a postcolonial, not simply nationalist, but working-class, agenda. In other words, genuine access to justice in postcolonial settings requires both the provision of the forum and the provision for, indeed pursuit of, specific outcomes.
C. Self-Determination: Individual and Collective
Self-determination has similar, added, dimensions in the postcolonial setting. Individual self-determination is, as mentioned, of central importance in mediation, its value measured, as Jacqueline Nolan-Haley has argued, through the principle of informed consent. 168 Nolan-Haley's enduring lesson is that individual will is socially structured (though, in dialectic fashion, I hasten to add, not necessarily determined) by social context. To be meaningful, individual choices must be informed. Given the juridical nature of dispute resolution, and, therefore, dominance of lawyers in mediation, informed consent often is discussed in terms of legal prerequisites, or the need to educate parties about their legal rights and options. But disputes are, of course, multi-dimensional. Beyond their legal aspects, they have personal, economic, cultural, political, emotional, and other dimensions. Arguably, therefore, parties' informed consent ought to extend to all these considerations.
The United States left an enduring colonial legacy in the Philippines, and it continues to dominate the country politically, economically, socially, culturally, and legally. Indeed, a U.S. State Department cable recently publicized by WikiLeaks quotes National Defense Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor, head of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Task Force, as saying that the U.S.-Philippine relationship is "just short of incest." 6 9 The United States created the Philippine legal system and profession, which it modeled after its own. It created the Philippine judiciary and the country's first law firms. 170 The Americans founded the Philippines' first law school. Its founding dean, George Malcolm, later became a Philippine Supreme Court justice.' 7 1 Malcolm apparently was proud of saying that his contemporaries on the high court were former students. 172 More to the point, the United States remains heavily involved in Filipino dispute resolution. Through the ABA, USAID, World Bank, and other institutions, as mentioned, the United States has sponsored, and continues to sponsor, reforms aimed at promoting, structuring, and restructuring Filipino community mediation.
This continued U.S. dominance of Philippine affairs in general and U.S. sponsorship of the ADR reform in particular is the social context structuring individual self-determination in community mediation in the Philippines. To be meaningful, therefore, individual consent must be informed by this social context in its varying dimensions, not just the legal, but the political, economic, social, and cultural as well. Here, the theoretical basis for ensuring informed consent, it seems to me, is the international right to selfdetermination, that is, the collective right of nations and peoples to chart their destiny free from neocolonial compulsion or interference.1 73 Indeed, the collective right to self-determination is the mirror image of neocolonial 169 See supra note 147. 170 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 8, at 76-77. For an insightful look at the Philippine legal elite, which has close ties to the U.S. legal elite, and which has engineered-and continues to engineer, with the assistance of USAID, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, the transformation of the Philippine legal system, including the propagation of U.S.-style ADR, see id. at 51-61, 76-89, 132-41.
neocolonial political allies-the question arises as to how individuals ought to exercise the right.
With these specific issues relating to access to justice and selfdetermination in postcolonial community mediation in mind, I return to the Philippine community mediation experience.
V. REALIZING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN PHILIPPINE COMMUNITY MEDIATION
Ensuring genuine access to justice and self-determination in Philippine community mediation requires both structural reform and counter-hegemonic practice. In this section, I return to the three axes I mentioned in Part Iprogram ideology and design, mediator role and practice, and external political and organizational support for disputing parties-and summarize various changes that need to be made with respect to each of the three systems-indigenous dispute resolution, the neighborhood justice system, and court-annexed mediation-to promote these goals. With respect to counter-hegemonic practices, the task, as Cain cogently argues, "is to ("Reviving precolonial law is difficult ... The customary law of the colonial period is a construct of the colonial era, formed in the interaction between European law and indigenous ways of handling differences. Reintroducing precolonial law into the vastly different social conditions of postcolonial countries is problematic.") (internal citations omitted). See also Lam, supra note 50, at 152 ("A prior indigenous social order does not yield automatically to a later statist order, particularly when, as is the case today, modem international law has repudiated the doctrine that territory may be lawfully acquired through conquest or other forms of coercion.").
otherwise widely-accepted principles of gender equality or child protection."1 88
The national constitution and international human rights conventions therefore have to provide a check on indigenous dispute resolution methods insofar as they have the potential to violate the fundamental human rights of women, children, ethnic or political minorities, or other persons and groups. Pimentel provides a framework by which this may be accomplished. Discussing legal pluralism in Mozambique, he argues for an approach that "maximizes" customary law by presumptively applying it "wherever it can. . and that limits review of customary court decisions to the narrowly-tailored questions of human rights and due process." 1 89 Instead of exercising appellate review over customary court decisions, Pimentel argues for collateral review in which state courts are empowered to overturn customary court decisions "only to the extent [they] violate[] principles reflected in a national constitution or in international human rights instruments that the country has signed or ratified." 1 90 Pimentel also argues for customary courts' presumptive jurisdiction over most rural disputes, observing, "access to justice issues alone suggests that the rule of law is better served when most cases enjoy the timely, responsive, and cost-effective adjudication that customary courts provide, particularly outside of urban centers." 9 1
In the Philippines, dispute resolution under pure indigenous methods and the state neighborhood justice system is often blurred. 192 This is problematic for two reasons: it undermines the integrity of indigenous processes and compromises parties' right to participate in one or the other, or both. To fully ensure access to justice and self-determination, therefore, a clear distinction between indigenous processes and the neighborhood justice system must be made. A bright-line distinction would also bolster our understanding of indigenous processes, prevent state cooptation of these processes, and make possible the implementation of Pimentel's collateral review framework. Separating the indigenous from the state-sponsored would clarify our object of inquiry, the boundaries of each, and therefore the points at which state review of narrow human rights and due process questions can be made.
B. Transforming the Neighborhood Justice System
The neighborhood justice (KP) system undermines access to justice and self-determination in at least two ways: it is a mandatory, jurisdictional, prerequisite to the use of the court system, and it is gender and politically biased. This should not be surprising given that the system's overarching purpose is social control from above and not justice from below. As I discuss in Part II, this dictatorship-era creation was aimed at channeling social discontent into organs of state power, and, there, individuating and depoliticizing it, a process Richard Abel has elaborated upon. He states, "[w]hen the state grants legal rights and establishes means of enforcementformal or informal-it inevitably undermines the efforts of the oppressed to help themselves, thereby fostering dependence. Because bourgeois legal rights are assigned to individuals, their pursuit encourages individualism and distracts from, or actually inhibits, collective action." 1 93 Little has changed from these beginnings. In a 2002 USAID-funded study that sought to strengthen the implementation of the KP system in the Muslim south, the site of a decades-long war between the Philippine government and Muslim secessionists, for example, Richard Blue, Emmanuel Leyco [sic] and Agnes Devanadero write that "peace and harmony," not the substantive resolution of the poverty and racism causing that war, were the desired goals.1 94 In lauding the potential of the KP system to peacefully resolve disputes, these authors cite the decline of crime in the area-curiously excepting casualties of that war. 195 Similarly, the postdictatorship transfer of KP jurisdiction from the national to local government has meant only that, today, parties must submit to local political elites and no longer the dictatorship. 196 In her study of KP cases, Aquino found that there remains an inherent political bias in the neighborhood justice system because the barangay captain, an elective office, chairs it, and therefore is predisposed against political opponents. 197 This is confirmed by Cobbie Palm, a pro-"fisher folk" advocate in Dumaguete, who told me that he had to "disengage from the KP system because of the KP's loyalty to [fishing] capitalists." 9 8 Aquino therefore makes the sensible recommendation to depoliticize the process by removing mediation functions from that office. 199 Aquino also recommends the creation of a board to select lupon members. Right now, barangay captains have sole authority to appoint mediators. 200 The creation of such a board, she argues, would promote balance in the lupon both in terms of sectors represented and gender. 20 1 Aquino found that lupon members are overwhelmingly middle-aged, Christian males, often with ties to the barangay captain. 2 02 With the argument that the KP system be optional, I echo these recommendations here.
However, Aquino's other recommendations regarding depoliticization and confidentiality merit further consideration. 2 03 Mediator neutrality and process confidentiality are, of course, hallmarks of U.S.-style mediation. But in cases involving issues of great social concern, these features are of secondary importance. In Nicaragua, for example, a mediation committee or third-party advocacy organization committed to the eradication of domestic violence "invite[s]" or "effectively require[s]" a spouse accused of it to take part in mediation. 2 04 As Raquel Aldana and Leticia Saucedo argue, "[t]hese methods, along with public shaming, are outside the traditional mediation practices and yet have proven effective in establishing the credibility of mediation as a powerful dispute resolution tool." 2 05
Franco makes a similar observation vis-A-vis the role of third-party advocacy organizations committed to land reform in the Philippines:
First, rural poor petitioners need access to a solid support structure, or alternative "rights-advocacy" network, for more effective political-legal mobilization. Second, they need an integrated political-legal strategy that was capable of simultaneously (i) activating state agrarian reform law, (ii) exploiting independent state actors' pro reform initiatives, and (iii) resisting the legal and extra-legal maneuvers of anti-reform elites. 20 6 In these situations, neutrality and confidentiality ignore and individualize social problems that, importantly, these states have explicit policies to remedy. In the process, neutrality, confidentiality, and individuation delimit the types of justice parties can access-in Cain's parlance, to the professionalized and incorporated varieties. With respect to issues of broad social concern, therefore, genuine access to justice and self-determination requires the collectivization and politicization of disputes, that is, the articulation of substantive normative agendas. This means the involvement of third-party advocacy organizations. Here, it is incumbent upon the mediator, parties, and third-party advocacy organizations to raise the collective, political grain of individual disputes. This opening up of the KP process has its risks, of course, especially in a country with an active communist insurgency. Palm told me that his group's advocacy led to its identification with the armed left, which then allowed the barangay captain to ask for military assistance. 20 7 Nonetheless, doing so is the only way to ensure that parties access the full range of outcomes befitting a nationalist, working class agenda. ("Unless it establishes a base of power outside the state legal system, popular justice is more likely to entrench and reinforce social changes already occurring in other segments of society or to consolidate changes accomplished through other forms of political transformation.").
207 Palm interview, supra note 198.
C. Reforming Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution
The aforementioned recommendations apply equally to court-annexed mediation where litigants are coerced into mediation and judicial dispute resolution, go through a protracted process, and are then pressured to settle. 20 8 As Timothy Hedeen has observed, self-determination may be compromised by various pressures to enter, continue, and settle in mediation. 209 Courts routinely order parties to mediation, and to engage the process in "good faith." 2 10 Parties often also defer to mediators in deciding whether or not to continue with mediation. 2 1 1 And there is always, by definition, the pressure to settle. 2 12 To promote individual self-determination in court-connected mediations, Hedeen argues that: 1) referrals to mediation . . . be explicitly free of coercion; 2) mediation consent forms ... be executed at the outset of mediation to affirm the disputants' informed consent . .. and understanding of a) the bounds of acceptable mediator pressure, b) their rights to terminate mediation at any time, and c) the court's policy that nonsettlement will not adversely affect either party's case; 3) Welsh's "cooling-off period" between the mediation session and the date any mediated settlements are finalized should be instituted; and 4) a blanket prohibition on substantive mediator reports and recommendations to the court .. . be enforced.
13
Court-annexed mediation in the Philippines violates many, if not all, of these principles. To begin with, PMC mediators are paid nearly three times more if they forge settlement. 2 14 Well aware of this fact, one mediator I observed had convened the parties ten times, and was planning on convening them even further, to settle one matter. 2 15 In another case, I observed a 208 Interestingly, the expansion of the court-annexed mediation program contemplated by the Department of Justice would prioritize extension to areas currently fraught with armed conflict, in particular to the north and south. Malenab-Hornilla presentation, supra note 112.
209 Hedeen, supra note 135, at 275. 210 Id. at 284.
211 Id. at 279-80. 212 Id. at 281-83. 213 Id. at 286 (internal citations omitted).
2 14 See supra note 117. 215 Indeed, the form used by PMC mediators allows for that many mediations.
678
[Vol. 27: 3 2012] woman speak to a court clerk about her good-faith engagement of the process, her reluctance to mediate further, and her request for a court hearing, only to be told by the clerk to attend yet another mediation session. 2 16 In the Philippines, the failure to attend court-annexed mediation is harsh: dismissal or an ex parte hearing in which judgment may be rendered against the nonappearing party. 217 This is, of course, coercive and violates elemental due process. Indeed, in all the court-annexed mediations I observed in the summer of 2010, the overarching tenor was one of forbearance, the mediators invariably cajoling and pleading the parties to settle. 2 18 As one mediator told me in pursuing a policy of scheduling at least three mediations, "We don't surrender outright. It's for their own good. They're reluctant because they're not enlightened. Once enlightened, they'll understand. Pinipiga naming ng pinipiga (we squeeze them repeatedly)." 2 19 These principles clearly run afoul of access to justice and self-determination standards. Not only are people pressured into settlement, but, by law, court-annexed mediators are court officials. As one mediator told me, "we are an extension of the court." 220 The PMC, one interviewee told me, is "at the mercy of local government, it is financed by local government." 2 21 Indeed, in one PMC office I visited, mediators sat behind their desks, as if judges, unlike the U.S. model of arraying mediators among the parties, and emphasized their status as court officers. 2 22 This official status therefore undermines the confidentiality of the process as mediators are subject to the authority of the presiding judges. Judicial dispute resolution amounts to nothing more than yet another way to coerce settlement-this time from a judge, albeit a non-presiding 'one. Here, the pressure to settle is obvious. As Judge Fe Bustamante of Dumaguete told me in an interview, "I think judges should not mediate." 223 In sum, each of the three systems governing Philippine community imediation is fraught with features that undermine genuine access to justice and self-determination. Indigenous dispute resolution needs to be better known and understood. Respect, not disregard or cooptation, ought to be the governing principle governing state responses to such processes, which, where necessary, must be supplemented or collaterally reviewed to ensure due process and other fundamental human rights. The neighborhood justice system ought to be voluntary, more gender-balanced, and depoliticized from the influence of local elites. In cases involving issues of social importance, neutrality and confidentiality must give way, and mediators and concerned third-party organizations provided advocacy roles. Court-annexed mediation and judicial dispute resolution likewise must be voluntary. All the various institutional pressures to settle-higher mediator fees for cases settled, case dismissal for nonappearance, and others-must be done away with. To ensure genuine access to justice and self-determination in Philippine community mediation, what is required is no less than structural reform and counter-hegemonic resistance. Without such efforts, these processes make a mockery out of mediation's hallowed objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION-FROM INFORMAL TO SOCIAL JUSTICE
Access to justice and self-determination by the disenfranchised and marginalized are central to the internationalization of U.S.-style ADR. Yet neocolonialist ideology pervades the propagation of U.S.-style mediation in the Philippines. These programs fail to recognize, disrespect, marginalize, assimilate, or integrate indigenous dispute resolution. They support a compulsory neighborhood justice system that is jurisdictional, patronagebased, politicized, and controlled by ruling elites often subservient to foreign interests. And they propagate a court-annexed mediation process that is skewed toward compulsory resolution and designed primarily to channel grassroots social conflict into forums that absorb political demand. As a consequence, ordinary Filipinos face enormous obstacles to access to justice and self-determination on the ground.
Dispute-processing is a cornerstone of democratic governance, and Filipinos have a rich tradition of governing from below. From pre-conquest societies, to the revolutions against Spain and the United States, to the People Power uprisings of 1986 and 2001, we have exercised our right to govern against colonial, dictatorial, and corrupt regimes. So, too, must our choice of dispute-resolution forums and participation in them. Without reforming current ADR procedures, access to justice and self-determination are mythical goals.
